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Abstract 18 
Portfolio management has been suggested as a tool to help implement ecosystem-based fisheries 19 
management (EBFM). The portfolio approach involves the application of financial portfolio 20 
theory to multispecies fishery management to account for species interdependencies, uncertainty, 21 
and sustainability constraints. By considering covariance among species, this approach allows 22 
economic risks and returns to be calculated across varying combinations of stock sizes. Tradeoffs 23 
between expected aggregate returns and portfolio risk can thus be assessed. We develop a 24 
procedure for constructing portfolio models to help implement EBFM in the northeastern United 25 
States, using harvest data from the National Marine Fisheries Service. Extending the work of 26 
Sanchirico et al. (2008), we propose a measure of excessive risk taking, which may be used by 27 
managers to monitor signals of non-optimal harvests. In addition, we conduct portfolio 28 
assessments of historical commercial fishing performance at different accounting stances: the 29 
large marine ecosystem, the New England region, and the community (fishing ports). We show 30 
that portfolio analysis could inform management at each level. Results of the study suggest that 31 
excessive risk taking is associated with overfishing, and risk management is therefore important 32 
for ensuring sustainability. 33 
 34 
  35 
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Introduction 36 
 With the evolution of increasingly more sophisticated tools for simulating the dynamic 37 
features of marine ecosystems, such as end-to-end models, among others (Link et al. 2011), 38 
fisheries scientists and managers now see concrete possibilities for the conservation and 39 
management of large-scale aggregate systems. This management would comprise multiple 40 
commercial stocks and other ecological components valued for their linkages to commercial 41 
targets or for their own non-market attributes.  This broader approach to fisheries management 42 
has been characterized as “ecosystem-based,” and while many difficulties remain in putting 43 
ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) into practice, it is now viewed widely as the 44 
future of fisheries management (Link 2002; Brodziak and Link 2002; Hall and Mainprize 2004; 45 
Pikitch et al. 2004; Rosenberg and McLeod 2005; Leslie and McLeod 2007; Fogarty 2013; GOC 46 
2014; Jacques 2015).  47 
 Apart from its many motivations, the use of EBFM as a decision framework necessitates 48 
consideration of the tradeoffs that arise when allocations or other policy alternatives are proposed 49 
or implemented. In particular, issues may arise when fishing quotas are set based solely on 50 
biological information for species that are valued differentially in seafood markets. At the core, 51 
human preferences for seafood can lead to targeting of species (or species groups) that differs 52 
fundamentally from those seen as appropriate from the perspective of ecological science.  53 
Further, different segments of society may disagree on desired ecological outcomes, leading to a 54 
collective inability to implement the most effective management measures (Arkema et al. 2006; 55 
Pitcher et al. 2009; Levin and Möllman 2015). Even so, for any given return from the harvest of 56 
a “portfolio” of fish from an ecosystem, society ought to choose a goal that minimizes the risks 57 
involved in realizing that return. 58 
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 Financial “portfolio management” has been suggested as an archetype for implementing 59 
EBFM (Hanna 1998; Hilborn et al. 2001; Sanchiricho and Smith 2003; Edwards et al. 2004; 60 
Sanchirico et al. 2008). Modern portfolio theory (MPT) has been used widely in managing 61 
financial investment accounts (e.g., retirement accounts). In MPT, assets (e.g., bonds and stocks) 62 
in an investment portfolio are selected jointly to minimize the overall risk associated with a 63 
specific target for the return on investment. The construction of a portfolio should consider how 64 
each asset price might change relative to the changes in the prices of other assets in the portfolio 65 
in order to maximize the probability of actually achieving a target aggregate return (Markowitz 66 
1952, Bordley and LiCalzi 2000). By selecting assets that have either negative or low correlation 67 
in their price fluctuations, the overall risk to the portfolio can be reduced. 68 
  The concept of financial portfolio management is useful for EBFM for several reasons. 69 
First, fish stocks are biological assets that have the potential to generate a flow of financial 70 
returns indefinitely (Edwards et al. 2004). Next, multispecies fishery management must account 71 
for species interdependencies, uncertainty, and sustainability constraints concurrently across all 72 
stocks under management. The portfolio approach provides a tractable manner to account for the 73 
time-varying interdependencies between harvested stocks stemming from the economic market, 74 
species biology, harvesting technology, and management regulations. The analytical framework 75 
captures a captain's choice of the fisheries in which to participate in a year, or a manager's choice 76 
of how to set preseason quotas allowing for return maximizing for the fleet, subject to 77 
uncertainty about catchability and markets during the season. Finally, through the explicit 78 
consideration of covariance among species, the portfolio approach allows economic risks to be 79 
traded off with the value of seafood supply. It should be emphasized, however, that the effective 80 
implementation of the approach ultimately requires accurate and timely assessments of targeted 81 
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species biomass. To assist in real-world management decisions, the portfolio model should be 82 
coupled with models that capture the structures and dynamics of relevant ecosystems (Sanchirico 83 
et al. 2008).   84 
 In the context of the portfolio framework, society’s objectives and constraints would be 85 
fully defined and evaluated according to normative criteria, specifying optimal policies that 86 
should be pursued to achieve desired social objectives. Within the context of EBFM, however, 87 
the full suite of social objectives can be difficult to define and model. Most applications of the 88 
portfolio approach rely on assumptions about either the form of the objective function (e.g., a 89 
quadratic function exhibiting the law of diminishing returns, implying that, as the revenue from 90 
fishing rises, the incremental growth in social benefits declines) or the distribution of returns 91 
(i.e., the fluctuation of fishing revenue follows a normal distribution). In this study, the latter is 92 
satisfied (cf., Meyer 1987).  93 
 Notwithstanding computational difficulties, it is the role of fishery managers (e.g., on the 94 
US Northeast Shelf Large Marine Ecosystem, these include the New England and Mid-Atlantic 95 
Fisheries Management Councils (NEFMC, MAFMC) and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 96 
Commission (ASMFC)) to identify management goals consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens 97 
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) [P.L. 94-265; P.L. 109-479] and the 98 
weights to be assigned to those goals. The portfolio analysis can be used to assess the additional 99 
risk induced into the system in attaining a broader suite of (often latent) objectives, by comparing 100 
the difference between the minimal possible risk level and the risk level associated with the 101 
revenue mix generated by management alternatives; and explicitly defining one facet of the 102 
trade-off made.  103 
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A small number of studies have begun to apply the concepts of portfolio theory to fishery 104 
management. Schindler et al. (2010) studied variance dampening across runs of heavily 105 
exploited Sockeye Salmon Oncorhynchus nerka in Bristol Bay, Alaska. The authors found that 106 
the decreased variability associated with multiple runs leads to an order-of-magnitude fewer 107 
required fisheries closures. Perruso et al. (2005) developed a static portfolio model to examine 108 
the behavior of fishermen faced with multiple targeting options in a random harvest fishery, 109 
applying the model to the pelagic longline fleet in the US Atlantic, Caribbean, and Gulf regions. 110 
The authors found that the model could be used to improve the spatial distribution of fisheries 111 
closures to reduce the mortality of juvenile Swordfish Xiphias gladius. Yang (2011) focused on 112 
the decisions of individual fishermen operating within the context of a transferable quota fishery 113 
in New Zealand. The author found that it could be rational for fishermen to purchase additional 114 
quota to establish a mix of yields that reduced risk. Halpern et al. (2011) applied a portfolio 115 
framework in the spatial dimension to examine the increased risks associated with policies that 116 
enhance equitable allocations of access to fish stocks in Southern California. 117 
Focusing on harvest levels, Sanchirico and Smith (2003) assessed the historical pattern of 118 
fisheries exploitation in the northwest Atlantic during 1950 to 2001 to show how food web 119 
interactions influenced sustainable harvest frontiers (which depict maximum catches possible 120 
across different risk levels). Sanchirico et al. (2008) developed a dynamic portfolio model with 121 
biological constraints, constructing mean-variance frontiers from 1975 to 2003 using 1962-2003 122 
data from the Chesapeake Bay. When setting species total allowable catches, the authors 123 
demonstrated gains from considering the variances and covariances of gross fishing revenues. 124 
Over the period from 1962 to 2003, they found that managers could have increased revenues 125 
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from fishing and reduced revenue variances by employing EBFM frontiers in setting catch 126 
levels. 127 
Our main objectives are to develop a procedure for constructing portfolio models to help 128 
implement EBFM in the US Northeast Region, using empirical harvest data from NMFS, and to 129 
demonstrate the feasibility and usefulness of the procedure through case studies. Our study 130 
builds on the framework explored by Sanchirico et al. (2008) with two extensions. First, we 131 
propose a method that managers can use to identify excessive risk taking and non-optimal 132 
harvest levels. In addition, we develop portfolio assessments of the historical performance of 133 
commercial fishing at different geographic scales (accounting stances): the Northeast Shelf LME 134 
(from Maine to North Carolina); the New England region (Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode 135 
Island); and the community (selected fishing ports). 136 
Analyses at different accounting stances are important. One of the national standards 137 
(National Standard 8) in federal fisheries law mandates that conservation and management 138 
measures should be adopted to minimize, to the extent practicable, adverse impacts on fishing 139 
communities. We undertake portfolio analyses for selected fishing ports to help fishery 140 
managers, municipal officials, and commercial fishermen who are concerned with managing 141 
risks at local levels. The community-level analysis identifies the sub-regional geographic 142 
distribution of risk, and comparing a community risk profile with profiles from geographically 143 
more aggregate models may show whether local risk is amplified or moderated at a broader 144 
regional scale.  145 
 We argue that the portfolio approach could contribute to improved management at each 146 
level. Results of our research may advance our understanding of the potential for portfolio 147 
management as a practical approach to help achieve EBFM in the US northeast. 148 
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 149 
Method 150 
Extending the classical financial portfolio model of Markowitz (1952), Sanchirico et al. 151 
(2008) presented a dynamic portfolio framework with biological constraints. The revenues from 152 
the fisheries are stochastic due to random variability in catches and fish prices, and there is a 153 
tradeoff between the mean and the variance of total revenue. In their model, a risk averse 154 
regional manager minimizes the variance (or risk) associated with generating an expected total 155 
revenue from the harvest of n different species that is at least as large as a target revenue R. By 156 
varying the target revenue, an efficient mean-variance frontier can be mapped out.  In this 157 
framework, efficiency means identifying the mix of species’ harvest levels that generates the 158 
smallest possible risk of failure in achieving the target revenue due to random variability. At time 159 
t, this efficient frontier can be estimated using quadratic programming by solving the 160 
minimization problem: 161 
        
                                         ,   (1) 
   
where i (= 1, ... , n) is the species index; µt is the n×1 vector of expected revenues; and t is the 162 
n×n revenue covariance matrix at t. wt is the n×1 vector of revenue weights to be calculated for 163 
time t. The revenue weights are control variables which enable a manager to choose harvest 164 
levels for individual species in the portfolio so that the overall risk is minimized. For example, 165 
wi,t is an element of wt, the revenue weight for species i in time t, which the fishery manager 166 
chooses to identify the harvest level for the species, so that the revenues from the species may be 167 
above or below its historical mean (an element in the vector µt). Wi,t is the maximum weight that 168 
can be placed on any single species in time period t. 169 
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An element of the covariance matrix t is the covariance of revenues of species i and j or 170 
the variance of species i (when j = i) at t, calculated as a weighted average over time with a 171 
decay factor : 172 
 173 
 
       
            
 
                    
           
 (2) 
with      
           
 
   
           
 (3) 
where ri,k is the revenue of species i at time k.  µi,t is an element in the vector µt in (1). Multiple 174 
drivers affecting the covariance matrix include ecological (food web trophic interactions), 175 
biological (fish stocks), and economic (market prices) effects, fishing operations and 176 
technologies (bycatch), and management (input and output controls, area management, etc.). 177 
Biological constraints enter the problem (1) as the maximum weight for species i at t 178 
(Wi,t): 179 
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 (5) 
where i,t is the sustainability parameter for species i at t, used by the manager to control harvest 180 
levels. i,t can be understood as a conduit to bring information external to the model to bear on 181 
the sustainable exploitation rate. Bi,t is the maximum sustainable catch; i,t is the weighted 182 
average of catches over time with decay; p is the fish price; and y is the catch quantity. Because 183 
the revenue from fishing is determined by the price and quantity of fish landed, the efficient 184 
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frontier is affected by both  and B. An increase in  or B would lead to a rise in return, and the 185 
frontier would shift up from F to F' (Figure 1). 186 
In our simulations, the decay factor is set at λ = 0.549 (meaning that 5% of the weight 187 
remains after 5 years), and the sustainability parameter is kept constant at γ = 1. Unfortunately, 188 
considerable uncertainties exist about the stock and flow relationships within the dynamic marine 189 
ecosystems. Actual values for Bi’s in the ecosystem context are unknown. Thus, our evaluation 190 
of risk-return tradeoffs is valid only with an intertemporal comparison for a given reference 191 
value of B. Although there are different ways to specify Bi, we examine two specifications in the 192 
study. One is to set Bi constant over time as the maximum catch in the entire study period (1964-193 
2012) for each species i. The other is to set Bit equal to the maximum catch up to year t for each 194 
species i, reflecting the fact that fishermen and managers are learning about the maximum catch 195 
levels over time. The second specification is used for all simulations unless noted otherwise. 196 
The revenue weights calculated from eqs. (1) through (5) can be used by fishery 197 
managers to design harvest strategies for the next period (t + 1).  Note that the framework also 198 
can be used to examine fisheries performance ex post: 199 
    
                 
     
 (6) 
where    is the n×1 vector of implicit weights that the fisheries manager would have chosen to 200 
realize the actual revenues at t,               ; and   is the vector of optimal revenue weights 201 
estimated at the actual total revenue        . The two terms in the numerator of (6) are 202 
represented as points b and a, respectively in Figure 1. The gap between the actual risk level 203 
borne by society and the optimal (minimized) risk level is the horizontal distance from a to b. 204 
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Thus, gt is a performance indicator measuring inefficient levels of risk in the fisheries or the 205 
normalized “risk gap” at t.  This measure can be expressed as the risk-gap per dollar of revenue.  206 
 The portfolio approach to marine resource management should be distinguished from a 207 
financial portfolio model. One of the key differences is that the weights do not sum to one. 208 
Essentially, an optimal harvest strategy is different from an investment strategy. Due to 209 
ecosystem constraints, fish harvests are feasible only within the available ranges of the 210 
corresponding fish stocks. Weights here represent only harvest levels, and there is no ability to 211 
“short” a fish species (i.e., to bet that returns from a fish stock will decline in the future), which 212 
would most realistically necessitate a futures market for fishing quota, which does not exist in 213 
the US Northeast Region. 214 
 Note that fisheries management has not been integrated explicitly into the portfolio 215 
approach presented here. Although eqs. (2) and (3) could accommodate the effects of 216 
management changes, such effects necessarily are entwined with other biological and 217 
technological effects. A clear understanding of management changes would require a structural 218 
model incorporating management variables. Further, fishing technologies have not been 219 
incorporated explicitly into the model constraints. Although selective harvesting is feasible 220 
across some fisheries regarded as distinct, such as for American Lobster Homarus americanus or 221 
Atlantic Sea Scallop Placopecten magellenicus, fisheries for other species, such as groundfish, 222 
involve the joint production of an array of species. Both the nonseperability of the production 223 
technology and the nonmalleability of capital could constrain portfolio selections. Consequently, 224 
in terms of its practical applications, the portfolio approach is more useful in identifying 225 
significant shifts in the linked nature-human system that would require closer investigation, not 226 
in setting specific harvest strategies for individual fisheries. 227 
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 228 
Northeast Fisheries and Data 229 
Data are from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) federal dealer purchase 230 
records for the Mid-Atlantic and New England regions. The data set comprises catches of all fish 231 
and shellfish landed in three New England states (Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island) 232 
during 1964-2012, and most other states in the Northeastern United States from 1990 to 2012. 233 
For 1990-2012, landing data are available from New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, 234 
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. Data for Connecticut and North Carolina are from 1996-235 
2012. Over 300 species are assembled into 26 species groups as specified in the ATLANTIS 236 
model (Link et al. 2010) (see Table 1). We used live weights for the portfolio analysis, given that 237 
the biological constraints are based upon on the in-situ biomass of the species—not on processed 238 
landings.  All values are in 2012 dollars. 239 
The data were corrected for landings of Silver Hake (Whiting) Merluccius bilinearis and 240 
Atlantic Herring Clupea harengus.  Other species of hake, including Offshore Hake Merluccius 241 
albidus, White Hake Urophycis tenuis, Red Hake Urophycis chuss, and Spotted Hake Urophycis 242 
regia, are not always differentiated by dealers. We use percentages from NMFS biological stock 243 
assessment surveys to decompose Silver Hake from other hakes. Atlantic herring is a high 244 
volume fishery, with landings sold by volume instead of weight. The dealer purchase records are, 245 
however, recorded in pounds, and these records are known to under-report the true landed 246 
weight. Further, some herring landings from state waters never enter the federal dealer purchase 247 
records. We therefore follow the stock assessments for herring by using data provided by the 248 
Maine Department of Marine Resources and federal Vessel Trip Report logbooks instead of data 249 
from the dealer database to address the issues of under-reporting in the time series. 250 
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For the past five decades, biomass and yields from fisheries found in the Northeast Shelf 251 
Large Marine Ecosystem (NSLME) have been affected significantly by unsustainably high levels 252 
of harvests on many species, ecological shifts, and changes to management regimes. Prior to 253 
1977, during a period when the northeast fisheries were essentially unregulated and significant 254 
harvests were taken by foreign fleets, total revenues accruing to US fleets in Maine, 255 
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island averaged $700 million (2012 dollars, Figure 2). In 1976, the 256 
US Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) established US jurisdiction over 257 
fisheries within a 200 nmi fishery conservation zone. With the concomitant exclusion of foreign 258 
fishing, fishing revenues increased to around $1 billion (for the same three states) by the early 259 
1980s. 260 
In recent decades, total commercial fishing revenues in New England have fluctuated 261 
around $1.1 billion, and, when the Mid-Atlantic region is also included, NSLME revenues rose 262 
to $1.7 billion (Figure 2). New England has accounted for 65-70% of the total NSLME revenue 263 
in recent years. Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island accounted for over 90% of the total 264 
revenue from New England. The fishery portfolio of the three New England states became 265 
increasingly more concentrated over the 49 years (Figures 3(a) and (b)). In 1964, the shares for 266 
Atlantic Sea Scallop, American Lobster, and the three major groundfish species (Atlantic Cod 267 
Gadus morhua, Haddock Melanogrammus aeglefinus, and Yellowtail Flounder Pleuronectes 268 
ferruginea) accounted for 13, 25, and 33%, respectively.  In contrast, shares for the same species 269 
were 31, 34, and 3% in 2012. That year, a commercial fishery “disaster” was declared for the 270 
northeast groundfish fishery. 271 
Key historical events help to explain the shifts in revenue trends and shares (Figures 2 272 
and 3). With a post-FCMA fishing fleet expansion, management became more challenging. From 273 
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1977 to 1982, the groundfish fishery was managed under output quotas for the three most 274 
important species: Atlantic Cod, Haddock, and Yellowtail Flounder. Under quota management, 275 
investment and fishing decisions were distorted by incentives to take quotas as quickly as 276 
possible.   Dissatisfaction with quota management led to its abandonment in 1982 in favor of 277 
indirect effort controls such as minimum fish sizes and fishing gear restrictions (Jin et al. 2002). 278 
The Atlantic Sea Scallop fishery grew unregulated until 1982, when the New England Fishery 279 
Management Council (NEFMC) implemented a minimum meat size standard with the Atlantic 280 
Sea Scallop FMP (Table 2). The number of full-time Atlantic Sea Scallop vessels increased 281 
eight-fold between 1977 and 1993, including construction of 152 new vessels during 1977-82 282 
alone. Aggregate fishing effort increased 500%. To survive financially, the Atlantic Sea Scallop 283 
sector depended upon the harvest of small recruits (Edwards 2001). 284 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, sharp declines in the catches of the traditionally 285 
valuable groundfish species led to the introduction of the Northeast Multispecies Fishery 286 
Management Plan (FMP) in 1986.  In 1994, FMP Amendment 5 led to significantly more 287 
stringent effort control measures, comprising a moratorium on new entrants and a days-at-sea 288 
program, in conjunction with increased mesh size requirements and the expansion of closed 289 
areas. In 1995, a fishery resource disaster was declared for the northeast groundfish fishery. The 290 
Multispecies Sector Program was introduced in 2010, establishing transferable output controls on 291 
the groundfish fishery (Table 2). 292 
Amendment 4 to the Atlantic Sea Scallop FMP created a limited-access permit system in 293 
1994 in the Georges Bank and Mid-Atlantic fisheries. The limited-access vessels were restricted 294 
by a seven-man crew limit and allocated nontransferable days-at-sea effort quotas depending on 295 
full-time, part-time, or occasional permit categories. The Atlantic Sea Scallop fishery struggled 296 
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with low landings for several years after Amendment 4 was implemented. Successive years of 297 
historically heavy sets of Atlantic Sea Scallop cohorts were protected by effort controls and by 298 
three large areas of the continental shelf that were closed in December 1994 in an attempt to 299 
rebuild important stocks of groundfish.  The growth of these cohorts allowed the Atlantic Sea 300 
Scallop biomass to increase significantly during 2001 and 2005, thereby supporting 301 
unprecedented landings (Edwards 2005).  302 
American Lobster landings have risen continuously since the early years of the series, 303 
increasing noticeably at the time of the establishment of the US fishery conservation zone in 304 
1977. At first, this increase comprised mostly otter trawl landings from deeper waters, but these 305 
yields were replaced by trap landings as deepwater trap technologies were refined. Increases in 306 
the last decade of the series were spurred by growing seafood demand and a concomitant 307 
expansion of nearshore effort. During this last decade, annual landings and revenues were 308 
increasingly variable but averaged 100 million pounds and $420 million respectively, making 309 
this fishery commercially the most lucrative in the US Northeast Region. Most of the landings 310 
occurred in the Gulf of Maine, which constitutes one of three distinct ecological stock areas. 311 
Stocks in the Inshore Southern New England area experienced recent severe declines that were 312 
likely tied to increased water temperatures and disease. The Gulf of Maine stock has not been 313 
biologically overfished, and, even with high levels of fishing effort, technically overfishing has 314 
not occurred there. Management has relied heavily upon industry self-governance, focusing on 315 
restrictions on carapace size and gear and bans on the taking of gravid females. Only marginal 316 
changes in regulation have occurred over time and across the seven conservation management 317 
areas established by the ASMFC. 318 
 319 
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Results 320 
Due to data limitations, we focus on the long-term evolution of fishery portfolios using 321 
data from only three New England states (Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island).  The 322 
efficient frontier is affected by biological constraints, namely the historical maximum sustainable 323 
catch for individual species (Bi). Annual efficient frontiers and actual risk-returns under the two 324 
different stock reference levels in 1965-2012 are illustrated in Figures 4(a) and (b). Because Bi is 325 
larger for all species under the first specification, efficient frontiers in panel (a) are above those 326 
in panel (b), especially during the first two decades.  In panel (a), the actual returns in the 1960s 327 
were significantly below the efficient levels, for the same risk levels, due to the presence of 328 
foreign fleets. In contrast, the second specification captures only the stocks accessible to the US 329 
fleet, and the actual returns in those years were very close to or above the frontiers in panel (b). 330 
Note, however, that model estimates for the 1960s are based on limited historical data.  For λ = 331 
0.549, the model’s burn-in period is 1964-1968 (5 years), see equations (2) and (3). An actual 332 
return occurring above the frontier is a violation of portfolio theory, but recall that the marine 333 
resource portfolio differs from a financial portfolio. The “violation” is a result of the 334 
specification of the stock constraints B (Figure 1). Note that the actual risk and return are 335 
unaffected by B, but the frontier is affected by it. 336 
The optimal revenue weights (wi,t) for the 26 species groups underlying the efficient 337 
frontiers in Figure 4(b) are depicted in Figure 5(a) as shares of the corresponding maximum 338 
revenue weights (Wi,t). As indicated in Figure 6(a) (subplots for Groups 3 and 4 in Figure 5(a)), 339 
the optimal strategies for 2005 and 2012 called for significantly lower harvests than the 340 
biological constraints (the shares were significantly below one) for both Atlantic Sea Scallop and 341 
American Lobster. For comparison, panel (b) of Figure 5 shows the ratio of implicit revenue 342 
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weights (representing actual harvest) to the maximum weight (         ). The implicit weights 343 
were above one for Atlantic Sea Scallop and close to one for American Lobster, indicating that 344 
both species were harvested at or above the maximum levels (Figure 6(b)). The model results 345 
suggest that overreliance on Atlantic Sea Scallop and American Lobster contributed to elevated 346 
risk-taking in 2005 and 2012. 347 
The level of inefficiencies (i.e., excessive risk taking) in the commercial fishing industry 348 
in the three New England states, measured by the risk gap g, from 1964 to 2012 is plotted in 349 
Figure 7(a). Four relatively large risk-gap “excursions” occurred during 1978-1981, 1991, 2005, 350 
and 2012, with one smaller excursion in 2000. Overall, excursions from risk-minimizing 351 
portfolios seem short-lived, as fleets appear to adjust to new constraints within at most a few 352 
years. This feature is robust with respect to the decay factor (λ). The inefficiencies are likely the 353 
results of (i) non-optimal harvests (as reflected by non-optimal revenue weights) of species with 354 
large revenue shares (Figure 4), resulting in elevated risks (the numerator in equation (6)), or (ii) 355 
reductions in total revenues (the denominator in equation (6)) due to the fact that the biological 356 
constraints have not been explicitly incorporated.   357 
The ratio of implicit revenue weight to the maximum weight was greater than one in 358 
some years for some species (e.g., Atlantic Sea Scallop in 2005), implying that the biological 359 
constraints were violated (         ) (Figure 5(b), and in more detail in Figure 6(b)). The 360 
overall level of overfishing can be estimated by the difference between the actual total revenue 361 
and adjusted total revenue. The adjusted total revenue at t is calculated as the sum of          over 362 
all species with the adjustment            if          . Thus, the adjusted total revenue is 363 
within the biological constraints. Results of the calculation suggest that significant overfishing 364 
occurred in 1978, 1980, 1981, 1991, 1992, and 2005 (Figure 7(b)). Excessive harvests led to 365 
18 
sharp increases in both total revenues (Figure 2) and risk levels (Figure 4(b)) in those years. Note 366 
that the actual risk at t is calculated in the same covariance matrix (eq. (2)) and the implicit 367 
weights, reflecting the actual harvest revenue, in eq. (6). Figures 7(a) and (b) depict the 368 
coincidence of the elevated risk gap with overfishing. 369 
The risk gap shown in Figure 7(a) is based on an assumption that the fish stock constraint 370 
Bit is equal to the maximum catch up to year t. To examine the robustness of the results, we 371 
conducted a sensitivity analysis of the risk gap with respect to the fish stock constraints (B). The 372 
results suggest that elevated risk gaps occur in the same years, and the fish stock constraints 373 
affect only the magnitude of the gaps (Figure 7(c)). The actual risk-return ratio, calculated using 374 
the same data that are depicted in Figure 4(b), is also correlated with the risk gap. 375 
Results of analyses at community levels demonstrate the usefulness of the portfolio 376 
framework for alternative geographic scopes. New Bedford, Massachusetts is an important 377 
fishing port in the northeast with total fishing revenues reaching $409 million in 2012. The 378 
primary species landed in New Bedford include Atlantic Sea Scallop, Yellowtail Flounder, 379 
Winter Flounder Pseudopleuronectes americanus, and Atlantic Cod, with average annual 380 
revenue shares over the entire study period (1964-2012) of 51.1, 14.2, 7.3 and 6.9%, 381 
respectively.  The revenue share of Atlantic Sea Scallop rose to more than 80% in 2011-2012. As 382 
the share continued to grow from 1998 to 2012 (Figure 8), the optimal weights (shown in red) for 383 
Atlantic Sea Scallop were significantly lower than the implicit weights (blue) between 2000 and 384 
2012, apparently calling for the diversification of harvests into other stocks, such as groundfish. 385 
The potential for diversification was constrained, however, by the depletion of Atlantic Cod and 386 
other groundfish stocks.  387 
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Another important fishing port is Gloucester, Massachusetts, where primary landings 388 
have been groundfish. Over the 5 decades, the annual average revenue shares for Atlantic Cod, 389 
Haddock, Atlantic Herring, American Lobster, Atlantic Pollock Pollachius pollachius, and Silver 390 
Hake were 19.6, 13.4, 7.6, 6.7, 6.3 and 6.2%.  With the depletion of groundfish, total annual 391 
revenues declined from over $120 million in the early 1980s to below $60 million in recent 392 
years. As shown in Figure 9, the optimal weights for Atlantic Cod (shown in red) switched to 393 
below the implicit weights (actual harvests) in 1987, preceding Amendment 5 in 1994. In the late 394 
1980s and 1990s, the optimal revenue weights stayed low relative to the implicit weights, 395 
implying that Atlantic Cod landings should be reduced. Declining stocks led eventually to the 396 
adoption of Amendment 13 and limits on days at sea in 2004. Although the portfolio model 397 
called for increased yields of Atlantic Cod in 2003 (see Figure 9), the Atlantic Cod stock was 398 
depleted and unavailable for harvest. As noted in the introduction and method sections, the 399 
biological constraints in the current portfolio model are based on historical catches and do not 400 
reflect the actual stock available for harvest in each period. If the portfolio model could be 401 
coupled with an ecosystem model, then stock availabilities could be updated in each period.     402 
A closer look at the risk gaps for the fishing ports (Figure 10) reveals that the regional 403 
risk-gap excursions (Figure 7(a)), the three New England states) can be explained by 404 
inefficiencies at the community level. The risk-gap excursions in 1978-1981 were the result of 405 
inefficiencies in Gloucester and New Bedford. The elevated gap in 2005 was driven by the large 406 
risk gaps in New Bedford.  Note also that the magnitudes of the risk gaps at the community level 407 
are greater than those at the regional level due to a compensating effect across ports at the higher 408 
level of aggregation. For example, in 2005, the risk gap was close to 1.5 in New Bedford (Figure 409 
10) but only 0.123 for the three New England states as a whole (Figure 7(a)). In the same year, 410 
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the risk gap was 0.115 at the LME level (Figure 11). A similar attenuation can be seen in the 411 
spike in the risk gap for Gloucester in 2000 (0.67 in Figure 10), which registers in the three state 412 
model at a much lower level of inefficiency (0.04 in Figure 7(a)). Overall, these inefficiencies 413 
were short lived, and the industry adjusted quickly for ecological and subsequent regulatory 414 
changes. 415 
 416 
Discussion 417 
As noted above, significant increases in the risk gap coincided with revenue growth and 418 
overfishing (Figures 2, 7(a) and (b)). In 1979, in the three New England states, Atlantic Sea 419 
Scallop revenues grew 49% over the previous year. Significant increases in Atlantic Cod 420 
landings (8-55% per year) and Haddock landings (7-19% per year) occurred between 1977 and 421 
1981. Stock declines in subsequent years led to major management actions in 1982. 422 
The revenues from groundfish landings declined during most of the 1980s. This trend 423 
reversed itself in 1990. In the three New England states, revenues from Yellowtail Flounder, 424 
Haddock, and Atlantic Cod rose respectively by 115, 31, and 25% over previous years. Greater 425 
than optimal harvests resulted in further declines in the groundfish stocks, leading to more 426 
stringent control measures in 1994 (Amendment 5 and the establishment of emergency area 427 
closures). 428 
The next overfishing event occurred in 2005, when annual growth in Atlantic Sea Scallop 429 
revenues was 55% in the three New England states. In 2006, excessive Atlantic Sea Scallop 430 
harvests led to a depletion of the stocks and the imposition of control measures, including area 431 
closures. 432 
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Our analysis reveals the following dynamic cycle: without effective effort control, rent-433 
seeking behavior leads to excessive harvests of certain valuable species and short-term increases 434 
in revenues. Overfishing causes stock depletion and the subsequent adoption of regulation.  435 
Because the optimal portfolio is dynamic and based on historical data, which incorporates 436 
changing ecological, economic, and regulatory factors, the model appears capable of detecting 437 
excessive harvests of certain species as excursions from the risk minimizing portfolio, i.e., 438 
excessive risk taking.  Thus, the portfolio framework foreshadows imminent stock depletion, 439 
providing a motivation for implementing management measures to levelize returns and to reduce 440 
excessive risk (Figure 12). 441 
Our analysis highlights a need for improvements in understanding ecological structures 442 
and processes (Sanchirico et al. 2008). We do not know the true maximum sustainable catch for 443 
individual species (Bi), necessitating a reliance on historical harvest levels as a proxy. 444 
Consequently, it is unclear whether the overharvesting identified in the model is unsustainable 445 
exploitation or merely sustainable harvesting outside the bounds of the historical time series. 446 
Indeed, without knowing the true biological constraints, any unprecedented catch level above 447 
historical landings could be viewed as risky, even if the biomass would easily permit such 448 
catches.   449 
An example is the development of a new fishery, such as that for Monkfish Lophius 450 
americanus in the 1990s, where, even if it was being exploited sustainably, the new fishery by 451 
definition would be harvesting above historical landing levels in the first few years. On the other 452 
hand, without accurate and timely assessments of targeted species biomass, catch levels below 453 
historical series also could be misinterpreted as non-optimal. In 2012, the fleets exhibited 454 
apparently risky concentration in harvests of Atlantic Sea Scallops and American Lobster. This 455 
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specialization was not the result of an economic decision to target shellfish but rather the result 456 
of a lack of groundfish to catch, precluding risk reduction through diversification into the latter.  457 
Nevertheless, this study highlights portfolio theory’s robust ability to identify imbalances 458 
in management strategies and to quantify objectively the historical extent of these imbalances. At 459 
its center, EBFM is concerned with managing the trade-offs within an aggregate fishery, and the 460 
portfolio approach equips managers with a tool for assessing those trade-offs strategically. The 461 
portfolio approach is an important addition to the suite of management tools now employed, 462 
which mostly ignore biological, technological, and market interactions.  463 
A range of biological multispecies models now are under development for the Northeast 464 
Shelf LME (Gamble and Link 2009, Link et al. 2009, Link et al. 2010, Gaichas et al. 2012, Curti 465 
et al. 2013, Fogarty 2013). Future research should focus on linking these multispecies models to 466 
portfolio models to characterize the biological constraints necessary for more realistic 467 
management evaluations. When coupled with multispecies Monte Carlo projections, the portfolio 468 
approach ultimately could allow the risks and returns of alternative management options to be 469 
assessed ex ante, thereby generating a better understanding of how risks are distributed across a 470 
range of geographic scales. 471 
The portfolio approach is a risk management tool that allows the explicit analysis of 472 
tradeoffs among risks and returns. We argue that fish stocks are biological assets that are 473 
comparable to financial assets, where the revenues from fish harvests comprise stochastic returns 474 
to the assets. Our model presents a risk-return analysis from an ecosystem perspective by 475 
including all major species (or species groups) in the US Northeast Region (e.g., groundfish, 476 
Atlantic Sea Scallop, and American Lobster). The financially optimal management of fishery 477 
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resources attempts to minimize the variance (the risk) associated with a target level of returns 478 
from fishing.  479 
There are several advantages to the portfolio approach as a tool for implementing EBFM. 480 
Excessive risk taking often is associated with overfishing, and risk management is therefore 481 
important for moving toward sustainability. Typically, a substantial increase in the risk gap is a 482 
signal that an unsustainable level of harvesting may be occurring. A closer investigation is 483 
needed to ascertain the cause of the increase in the risk gap, because, absent timely assessments 484 
of relevant biological constraints, catch levels below historical series also could lead to a rise in 485 
the risk gap. The portfolio approach identifies those species (or species groups) that are being 486 
overfished through a comparison of optimal harvests with actual harvests (optimal revenue 487 
weights with implicit weights). The set of optimal weights provides useful information that could 488 
help fishery managers implement EBFM at a range of geographic levels. A critical insight is that 489 
EBFM could be enhanced with a better understanding of the underlying ecological structures and 490 
processes that could limit adjustments to minimize risks. 491 
A key concept in the management of risk is the diversification across assets in a portfolio 492 
to take full advantage of negative correlations in returns. With respect to the portfolio comprising 493 
the commercial fisheries of the US Northeast Region, we show that excessive risk typically is 494 
associated with lack of variety in the mix of species landed. Regions or communities may exhibit 495 
high levels of risk, resulting from constraints on the abilities of the relevant fishermen to 496 
diversify their catches, due to depleted stocks, regulations meant to conserve depleted stocks, or 497 
both. In such cases, the difficulties faced by fishermen of switching among available target 498 
stocks, because of nonselective technologies or human capital constraints, may exacerbate risk 499 
taking. Importantly, increased riskiness at local levels may be moderated at broader geographic 500 
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levels, and, in the US Northeast Region, riskiness tends to be fleeting. The analysis of the scale 501 
and duration of risk gaps could help characterize the capacity for diversification to mitigate risk 502 
and thereby help improve sustainability in fisheries management.  503 
 504 
Acknowledgements 505 
This article was prepared under award numbers NA09OAR4320129 (Cooperative Institute for 506 
the North Atlantic Region) from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US 507 
Department of Commerce and with additional support from the J. Seward Johnson Fund in 508 
Support of the WHOI Marine Policy Center. 509 
  510 
25 
References 511 
Arkema, K.K., S.C. Abramson, and B.M. Dewsbury. 2006. Marine ecosystem-based 512 
management: from characterization to implementation. Frontiers in Ecology and the 513 
Environment 4: 525–532. 514 
 515 
Bordley, R., and M. LiCalzi. 2000. Decision analysis using targets instead of utility functions. 516 
Decisions in Economics and Finance 23: 53-74. 517 
 518 
Brodziak, J, and J. Link. 2002. Ecosystem-based fishery management: what is it and how can we 519 
do it? Bulletin of Marine Science 70:589-61. 520 
 521 
Curti, K.L., J.S. Collie, C.M. Legault, and J.S. Link. 2013. Evaluating the performance of a 522 
multispecies statistical catch-at-age model. Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 523 
70(3):470-484. 524 
 525 
Edwards, S.F. 2001. Rent-seeking and property rights formation in the U.S. Atlantic Sea Scallop 526 
fishery. Marine Resource Economics 16(4):263-275. 527 
 528 
Edwards, S.F. 2005. Accounting for rents in the U.S. Atlantic Sea Scallop fishery. Marine 529 
Resource Economics 20(1):61-76. 530 
 531 
Edwards, S.F., J.S. Link, and B.P. Rountree. 2004. Portfolio management of wild fish stocks. 532 
Ecological Economics 49:317– 329. 533 
26 
 534 
Fogarty, M.J. 2013. The art of ecosystem-based fishery management. Canadian Journal of 535 
Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 71:479-490. 536 
 537 
Gaichas, S., R. Gamble, M. Fogarty, H. Benoit, T. Essington, C. Fu, M. Koen-Alonso, and J. 538 
Link. 2012. Assembly rules for aggregate-species production models: simulations in support of 539 
management strategy evaluation. Marine Ecology Progress Series 459: 275-292. 540 
 541 
Gamble, R.J., and J.S. Link. 2009. Analyzing the tradeoffs among ecological and fishing effects 542 
on an example fish community: A multispecies (fisheries) production model. Ecological 543 
Modelling 220: 2570 – 2582. 544 
 545 
Global Ocean Commission (GOC). 2014. From decline to recovery—a rescue package for the 546 
global ocean. Somerville College, University of Oxford (June). Oxford, UK. Available: 547 
www.globaloceancommission.org. (March 4, 2015). 548 
 549 
Hall, S.J., and B. Mainprize. 2004. Towards ecosystem-based fisheries management. Fish and 550 
Fisheries 5:1-20. 551 
 552 
Halpern, B.S., C. White, S.E. Lester, C. Costello, S.D. Gaines. 2011. Using portfolio theory to 553 
assess tradeoffs between return from natural capital and social equity across space. Biological 554 
Conservation 144:1499-1507. 555 
 556 
27 
Hanna, S. 1998. Institutions for marine ecosystems: economic incentives and fishery 557 
management. Ecological Applications 8:S170-S174. 558 
 559 
Hilborn, R., J.J. Maguire, A.M. Parma, and A.A. Rosenberg. 2001. The precautionary approach and 560 
risk management: can they increase the probability of successes in fishery management? Canadian 561 
Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 58: 99-107. 562 
 563 
Jacques, P.J. 2015. Are global fisheries a panarchy? Marine Policy 53:165-170. 564 
 565 
Jin, D., E. Thunberg, H.L. Kite-Powell, K. Blake. 2002. Total factor productivity change in New 566 
England groundfish fisheries: 1964-1993. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 567 
44(3):540-556. 568 
 569 
Leslie, H.M., and K.L. McLeod. 2007. Confronting the challenges of implementing marine 570 
ecosystem-based management. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 5:540-548. 571 
 572 
Levin, P.S., and C. Möllman. 2015. Marine ecosystem regime shifts: challenges and 573 
opportunities for ecosystem-based management. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 574 
B 370:1659. 575 
 576 
Link, J.S. 2002. Ecological considerations in fisheries management: when does it matter? Fisheries 577 
27(4):10-17. 578 
 579 
28 
Link, J., L. Col, V. Guida, D. Dow, J. O’Reilly, J. Green, W. Overholtz, D. Palka, C. Legault, J. 580 
Vitaliano, C. Griswold, M. Fogarty, and K. Friedland. 2009. Response of balanced network models 581 
to large-scale perturbation: Implications for evaluating the role of small pelagic in the Gulf of 582 
Maine. Ecological Modelling 220: 351-369. 583 
 584 
Link, J.S., E.A. Fulton, and R.J. Gamble. 2010. The northeast US application of ATLANTIS: A 585 
full system model exploring marine ecosystem dynamics in a living marine resource 586 
management context. Progress in Oceanography 87:214–234. 587 
 588 
Link J.S., R.J. Gamble, and M.J. Fogarty. 2011. An overview of the NEFSC’s ecosystem 589 
modeling enterprise for the Northeast US Shelf Large Marine Ecosystem: towards ecosystem-590 
based fisheries management. US Dept Commer, Northeast Fish Sci Cent Ref Doc. 11-23; 89 p. 591 
 592 
Markowitz, H. 1952. Portfolio selection. Journal of Finance 7:77-91. 593 
 594 
Meyer, J. 1987. Two-moment decision models and expected utility maximization. American 595 
Economic Review 77(3): 421-430. 596 
 597 
Perruso, L., R.N. Weldon, and S.L. Larkin. 2005. Predicting optimal targeting strategies in 598 
multispecies fisheries: a portfolio approach. Marine Resource Economics 20:25–45. 599 
 600 
Pikitch, E.K., C. Santora, E.A. Babcock, A. Bakun, R. Bonfil, D.O. Conover, P. Dayton, P. 601 
Doukakis, D. Fluharty, B. Heneman, E.D. Houde, J. Link, P.A. Livingston, M. Mangel, M.K. 602 
29 
McAllister, J. Pope, and K.J. Sainsbury. 2004. Ecosystem-based fishery management. Science 603 
305:264-265. 604 
 605 
Pitcher, T.J., D. Kalikoski, K. Short, D. Varkey, and G. Pramo. 2009. An evaluation of progress 606 
in implementing ecosystem-based management of fisheries in 33 countries. Marine Policy 607 
33:223-232. 608 
 609 
Rosenberg, A.A., and K.L. McLeod. 2005. Implementing ecosystem-based approaches to 610 
management for the conservation of ecosystem services: politics and socio-economics of 611 
ecosystem-based management of marine resources. Marine Ecology Progress Series 300: 271-612 
274. 613 
 614 
Sanchirico, J.N., M.D. Smith, and D.W. Lipton. 2008. An empirical approach to ecosystem-based 615 
fishery management. Ecological Economics 64:586-596.  616 
 617 
Sanchirico, J.N., and M.D. Smith. 2003. Trophic portfolios in marine fisheries: a step towards 618 
ecosystem management. Proc. American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting. 619 
Montreal (July). 620 
 621 
Schindler, D.E., R. Hilborn, B. Chasco, C.P. Boatright, T.P. Quinn, L.A. Rogers, and M.S. 622 
Webster. 2010. Population diversity and the portfolio effect in an exploited species. Nature 623 
465:609-612. 624 
 625 
30 
Yang, M.M. 2011. The portfolio analysis for multi-species fisheries management in New 626 
Zealand: an application in a fishing firm. Ph.D. dissertation. Economics Department, University 627 
of Auckland, Auckland, NZ. Available: https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/ handle/2292/7476. 628 
(April 8, 2015).   629 
31 
Table 1. Species Groups 630 
 631 
Group 
No. 
Group 
Code 
Species 
1 BFF1 Hard Clam Mercenaria mercenaria, Soft Shell Clam Mya arenaria, Ocean Quahog Arctica 
islandica, Unclassified Clam Species 
2 BFF3 Blue Mussel Mytilus edulis, Eastern Oyster Crassostrea virginica, Bay Scallop Argopecten 
irradians 
3 BFS Atlantic Sea Scallop Placopecten magellanicus 
4 BML American Lobster Homarus americanus 
5 BMS Blue Crab Callinectes sapidus, Lady Crab Ovalipes ocellatus, Green Crab Carcinus maenas, 
Red Crab Chacean quinquedens, Jonah Crab Cancer borealis, Rock Crab Cancer irroratus, 
Cancer Crab Cancer pagurus, Spider Crab Libinia emarginata, Snow Crab Chionoecetes 
opilio, Horseshoe Crab Limulus polyphemus, Knobbed Whelk Busycon carica 
6 FBP Bay Anchovy Anchoa mitchilli, Butterfish Peprilus triacanthus, Atlantic Chub Mackerel 
Scomber japonicus, Atlantic Silverside Menidia menidia, Spanish Mackerel Scomberomorus 
maculatus 
7 FDB Silver Hake Merluccius bilinearis 
8 FDC Atlantic Croaker Micropogonias undulatus, Cusk Brosme brosme, Black Drum Pogonias 
cromis, Red Drum Sciaenops ocellatus, American Eel Anguilla rostrata, Grenadiers 
Macrouridae spp., Offshore Hake Merluccius albidus, Red Hake Urophycis chuss, John 
Dory Zeus faber, Opah Lampris guttatus, Ocean Pout Zoarces americanus, Scup Stenotomus 
chrysops, Black Sea Bass Centropristis striata, Weakfish Cynoscion regalis, Spotted Sea 
Trout Cynoscion nebulosus, Spot Leiostomus xanthurus, Striped Bass Morone saxatilis, 
Atlantic Sturgeon Acipenser oxyrhynchus oxyrhynchus, Tautog Tautoga onitis, Blueline 
Tilefish Caulolatilus microps, Sand Tilefish Malacanthus plumieri, Golden Tilefish 
Lopholatilus chamaeleonticeps, Unclassified Tilefish, White Perch Morone americana, 
Offshore Hake Unclassified Merluccius spp. or Urophycis spp. 
9 FDC2 Atlantic Pollock Pollachius pollachius 
10 FDC7 Acadian Redfish Sebastes fasciatus 
11 FDD Monkfish Lophius americanus 
12 FDE1 Atlantic Menhaden Brevoortia tyrannus* 
13 FDF Yellowtail Flounder Pleuronectes ferruginea 
14 FDO Haddock Melanogrammus aeglefinus 
15 FDS Atlantic Cod Gadus morhua 
16 FPL Atlantic Mackerel Scomber scombrus 
17 FPS Atlantic Herring Clupea harengus 
18 FVB2 Summer Flounder Paralichthys dentatus  
19 FVB3 Winter Flounder Pseudopleuronectes americanus 
20 FVB4 Witch Flounder Glyptocephalus cynoglossus  
21 FVB6 American Plaice Hippoglossoides platessoides  
22 FVD Atlantic White Hake Urophycis tenuis 
23 FVT3 White Marlin Kajikia albidus, Atlantic Blue Marlin Makaira nigricans, Swordfish Xiphias 
gladius 
24 PWN2 Brown Shrimp Crangon crangon, Atlantic Shrimp Litopenaeus setiferus, Gulf of Maine 
Shrimp Pandalus borealis, Crangon Crangon Septemspinosa, Unclassified Shrimp 
25 SSK1 Rosette Skate Leucoraja garmani, Little Skate  Leucoraja erinacea, Winter Skate Leucoraja 
ocellata, Barndoor Skate Dipturus laevis, Smooth Skate Malacoraja senta, Thorny Skate 
Amblyraja radiata, Clearnose Skate Raja eglanteria 
26  Others** 
 632 
* Database includes partial data for menhaden. 633 
32 
** Including Groups BFF2 (Atlantic Surf Clam Spisula solidissima), CEP (Longfin Squid Loligo 634 
pealei, Northern Shortfin Squid Illex illecebrosus), FVT1 (Bluefin Tuna Thunnus thynnus), 635 
FVT2 (Other Tuna Species), SHB (Spiny Dogfish Squalus acanthias), and other species/groups.  636 
These groups cannot be examined separately due to incomplete data series or relatively low 637 
economic values.  638 
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Table 2. Management Timeline. 639 
Year Groundfish Atlantic Sea Scallop 
1977 TACs established for Atlantic Cod, 
Haddock, and Yellowtail Flounder 
 
1982 Interim Groundfish Plan replaced TACs 
with input controls 
Created long-term management 
program for Atlantic Sea Scallop 
fishery (FMP) 
1986 Northeast Multispecies FMP approved FMP Amend 1, established minimum 
size meat count standard 
1994 FMP Amend 5 established mesh size 
requirements, expanded closed areas and 
imposed moratorium on new entrants 
FMP Amend 4, implemented an effort 
control system 
1995 Northeast groundfish fishery declared a 
fishery resource disaster 
Framework Adjustments 4, 5 and 6, 
reduction in crew size limit, gear 
restrictions, and vessel tracking system 
(VTS) 
1996 FMP Amend 7 accelerated DAS reduction 
program 
Framework Adjustment 7, permanent 
reduction in crew size 
1997  Amend 6, implemented a gear conflict 
management program 
  
1998 Northeast groundfish vessel buyback 
program expanded 
Framework Adjustment 10, area 
closure 
2001 Northeast groundfish permit buyback 
program implemented 
Extension of closed areas 
2004 FMP Amend 13 established a DAS transfer 
program and created a process for 
establishing sectors 
Amend 10,  introduced  an area 
rotation management program 
2005  Framework Adjustment 17,  vessel 
monitoring system (VMS) 
requirements 
2007 Framework 42 of FMP Amend 13 reduced 
DAS and implemented differential DAS 
Amend 13, industry-funded observer 
program  
34 
counting areas 
2010 FMP Amend 16 established Northeast 
Multispecies Sector Program and ACLs 
 
2011  Amend 15, implemented annual catch 
limits (ACLs) and accountability 
measures (AMs) 
2012 Fishing year 2013 of Northeast groundfish 
declared a commercial fishery failure 
Amend 17, enforcement of collection-
of-information requirements 
  640 
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Figure Captions and Notes 641 
Figure 1. Efficient Frontier and the Risk Gap. R represents a given level of total revenue; F and 642 
F’ are two efficient frontiers; b denotes the actual portfolio; a and a’ denote the optimal 643 
portfolios on F and F’. 644 
 645 
Figure 2. Total Revenue of Fish Landings in the Northeast Region, 1964-2012. 646 
 647 
Figure 3 (a). Revenue Shares by Species, ME, MA and RI, 1964-2012. 648 
Figure 3 (b). Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, 1964-2012. 649 
 650 
Figure 4 (a). Efficient Frontiers and Actual Portfolios, ME, MA and RI, 1965-2012. B = 651 
maximum landings in the entire study period (1964-2012). Vertical axis depicts the expected 652 
return ($100m, 2012); Horizontal axis depicts the risk level (s.d. of revenue); Green circle 653 
denotes the actual portfolio in that year. 654 
Figure 4 (b). Efficient Frontiers and Actual Portfolios, ME, MA and RI, 1965-2012. Bt = 655 
maximum landings up to year t. Vertical axis depicts the expected return ($100m, 2012); 656 
Horizontal axis depicts the risk level (s.d. of revenue); Green circle denotes the actual portfolio 657 
in that year. 658 
 659 
Figure 5(a). Optimal Revenue Weight Shares by Species Groups, ME, MA and RI, 1965-2012. 660 
The revenue weight share = weight (wi,t) /maximum weight (Wi,t) for each species group i, 661 
calculated at expected return = half of the max return. Species groups: 1-BFF1/Clams, 2-662 
BFF3/Blue Mussel, etc., 3-BFS/ Atlantic Sea Scallop, 4-BML/American Lobster, 5-BMS/crabs, 663 
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6-FBP/Bay Anchovy, etc., 7-FDB/Silver Hake, 8-FDC/Atlantic Croaker, etc., 9-FDC2/Pollock, 664 
10-FDC7/Redfish, 11-FDD/Goosefish, 12-FDE1/Menhaden, 13-FDF/Yellowtail Flounder, 14-665 
FDO/Haddock, 15-FDS/Atlantic Cod, 16-FPL/Atlantic Mackerel, 17-FPS/Atlantic Herring, 18-666 
FVB2/Summer Flounder, 19-FVB3/Winter Flounder, 20-FVB4/Witch Flounder, 21-667 
FVB6/American Plaice, 22-FVD/White Hake, 23-FVT3/Marlin, etc., 24-PWN2/Shrimp, 25-668 
SSK1/Skates, 26-others (see Table 1). 669 
Figure 5(b). Implicit Revenue Weights by Species Groups, ME, MA and RI, 1965-2012. Species 670 
group definition is the same as in Figure 5(a). 671 
 672 
Figure 6(a) and (b). Atlantic Sea Scallop and American Lobster: Optimal Revenue Weight 673 
Shares (a) and Implicit Revenue Weights (b) by Species Groups, ME, MA and RI, 1965-2012. A 674 
closer look of subplots for Groups 3 and 4 in Figure 5(a) and (b).  675 
 676 
Figure 7(a) and (b). Inefficiency in the Commercial Fishing Industry (a) and Overfishing (b), 677 
ME, MA, RI, 1964-2012. Vertical axis in (a) shows the risk gap (risk level per dollar of 678 
revenue). Vertical axis in (b) shows the difference between the actual total revenue and the 679 
adjusted total revenue under stock constraints ($100m, 2012). 680 
Figure 7(c). Sensitivity of Risk Gap with Respect to Fish Stock Constraints (B). 681 
 682 
Figure 8. Optimal and Implicit Weights and Revenue Share for Atlantic Sea Scallop, New 683 
Bedford, 1964-2012. 684 
 685 
Figure 9. Optimal and Implicit Weights for Atlantic Cod, Gloucester, 1964-2012. 686 
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 687 
Figure 10. Risk Gaps at Port Level, 1964-2012. Gloucester (a); New Bedford (b). Vertical axis 688 
shows the risk gap (risk level per dollar of revenue). 689 
 690 
Figure 11. NELME Efficient Frontiers and Actual Portfolios under Stock Assumption I, 1990-691 
2012. Vertical axis shows the risk gap (risk level per dollar of revenue). 692 
 693 
Figure 12. Portfolio Model as an Ecosystem Management Tool. 694 
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ME, MA, RI 
New England 
NELME 
3(a) 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
2
 
1
9
7
4
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
8
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
2
 
R
ev
en
u
e
 S
h
ar
e
 
Year 
Scallop 
Lobster 
Cod, Haddock, Yellowtail Flounder 
Others 
3(b) 
0.00 
0.05 
0.10 
0.15 
0.20 
0.25 
0.30 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
 
1
9
7
2
 
1
9
7
3
 
1
9
7
4
 
1
9
7
5
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
7
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
9
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
H
H
I 
Year 
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1965
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1966
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1967
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1968
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1969
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1970
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1971
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1972
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1973
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1974
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1975
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1976
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1977
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1978
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1979
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1980
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1981
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1982
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1983
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1984
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1985
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1986
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1987
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1988
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1989
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1990
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1991
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1992
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1993
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1994
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1995
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1996
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1997
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1998
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
1999
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2000
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2001
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2002
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2003
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2004
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2005
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2006
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2007
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2008
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2009
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2010
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2011
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
2012
1965 
1989 
1981 
1973 
1997 
2005 2012 
2004 
1996 
1988 
1980 
1972 
4(a) 
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1965
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1966
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1967
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1968
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1969
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1970
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1971
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1972
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1973
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1974
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1975
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1976
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1977
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1978
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1979
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1980
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1981
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1982
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1983
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1984
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1985
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1986
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1987
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1988
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1989
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1990
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1991
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1992
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1993
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1994
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1995
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1996
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1997
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1998
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
1999
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2000
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2001
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2002
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2003
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2004
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2005
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2006
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2007
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2008
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2009
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2010
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2011
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
2012
1965 
1973 
1981 
1989 
1997 
2005 
1972 
1980 
1988 
1996 
2004 
2012 
4(b) 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
2
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
3
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
4
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
5
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
6
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
7
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
8
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
9
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
10
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
11
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
12
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
13
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
14
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
15
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
16
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
17
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
18
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
19
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
20
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
21
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
22
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
23
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
24
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
25
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
26
 1 
1973 
 3 
 4 
 7 
10 
13 
16 
19 
25 
22 24 
21 
18 
15 
 6 
 9 
12 
5(a) 
Year 
Year 
Year 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
1
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
3
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
4
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
5
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
6
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
7
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
8
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
9
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
10
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
11
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
12
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
13
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
14
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
15
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
16
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
17
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
18
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
19
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
20
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
21
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
22
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
23
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
24
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
25
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
26
 1 
 4 
 7 
10 
13 
16 
19 
22 
25 
 3 
 6 
 9 
12 
15 
18 
21 
24 
5(b) 
Year Year 
Year 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
3
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
4
 Scallops  Lobster 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
3
 Scallops 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
0.5
1
1.5
4
 Lobster 
6(a) and (b) 
(a) 
(b) 
 Year  Year 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
(a) 
(b) 
7(a) and (b) 
 Year 
7(c) 
-0.05 
0.00 
0.05 
0.10 
0.15 
0.20 
0.25 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
 
1
9
7
2
 
1
9
7
3
 
1
9
7
4
 
1
9
7
5
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
7
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
9
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
Year 
B Bt 2/3B Actual Risk-Return Ratio 
0.0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1.0 
1.2 
1.4 
1.6 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
 
1
9
7
2
 
1
9
7
3
 
1
9
7
4
 
1
9
7
5
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
7
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
9
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
Year 
Implicit Weight 
Revenue Share 
Optimal Weight 
8 
0.0 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
7
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
1
 
1
9
7
2
 
1
9
7
3
 
1
9
7
4
 
1
9
7
5
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
7
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
9
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
Year 
Implicit Weight 
Optimal Weight 
9 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
(a) 
(b) 
10(a) and (b) 
 Year 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
11 
 Year 
STOCK DECLINE 
CONSERVATION & 
MANAGEMENT 
MEASURES 
YIELD (REVENUE) 
INCREASE 
EXCESSIVE HARVEST 
EXCURSION FROM 
RISK MINIMIZING 
PORTFOLIO 
12 
